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Modern scholarship has established that Leontius the Monk, the author of several 
Christological treatises, is identical with the monk Leontius of Byzantium who 
appears in Cyril of Scythopolis’ Life of Sabas. However, once this identification is 
made we are confronted with a strange discrepancy. Cyril characterises Leontius as 
one of the leaders of the Origenist faction within Palestinian monasticism but in his 
writings Leontius does not speak openly about his allegiances.1 The only clues that 
he gives are found in his early work Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos. There he 
borrows a pithy phrase from Abba Nonnus, another famous Origenist of the time 
who also figures prominently in Cyril’s Life of Sabas; and he quotes a passage from 
Evagrius’ most controversial text, the Capita gnostica. However, even this we only 
know from marginal glosses because in the text itself Leontius does not name 
names.2 Moreover, the quotation from Evagrius is a bland statement about the power 
of love, and Nonnus’ phrase refers not to Origenist lore but to the Christological 
debate.3 The same problem arises when we turn to the arguments that Leontius puts 
forward in order to justify the Creed of Chalcedon. Evans’ hypothesis that Contra 
Nestorianos et Eutychianos contains references to the pre-existing soul of Christ 
have been conclusively disproved by Brian Daley and it is now universally accepted 
                                                 
1 Cf. most recently D. Hombergen, The Second Origenist Controversy. A New Perspective on 
Cyril of Scythopolis’ Monastic Biographies as Historical Sources for Sixth-Century Origenism 
(Rome, 2001), pp. 133-138: ‘Leontius the Origenist, as he appears in Cyril’s writings’.  
2 Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos, PG 86, 1285A6-B1; ed. B. E. Daley, Leontius of Byzantium: 
A Critical Edition of His Works, With Prolegomena (Diss. Oxford, 1978), henceforth abbreviated to 
CNE. Reference to Nonnus in CNE, PG 86, 1276A1, ed. Daley p. 6, l. 5: εὐλαβὴς καὶ θεῖος ἀνήρ; 
and scholion in the apparatus: περὶ τοῦ ἀββᾶ Νόννου φησί; quotation from Evagrius in CNE, PG 
86, 1285A14-15, ed. Daley, p. 13, l. 22-23: τινὶ τῶν πρὸ ἡμῶν ἀνδρὶ θεοσόφῳ; and scholion in the 
apparatus: περὶ Εὐαγρίου. Cf. F. Loofs, Leontius von Byzanz und die gleichnamigen Schriftsteller 
der griechischen Kirche (Texte und Untersuchungen, 3; Leipzig, 1887), p. 289, 295.  
3 Nonnus called the Eutychians and Nestorians ἐναντιοδοκῆται, cf. CNE, PG 86, 1276A7, ed. 
Daley, p. 6, l. 5. For the passage from Evagrius cf. Capita gnostica, IV.50, ed. and tr. A. 
Guillaumont, Les six Centuries des Képhalaiagnosticad'Évagre le Pontique. Édition critique de la 
version syriaque commune et édition d'une nouvelle version syriaque, intégrale, avec une double 
traduction française (Patrologia Orientalis, XXVIII.1, Paris, 1958), pp. 158-159. 
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that Leontius follows the official teaching that the incarnation is a composition of a 
divine nature with a human nature consisting of a body and a soul.4 As a consequence 
most contemporary scholars are of the opinion that Leontius was not an Origenist 
in the strict sense of the word. They argue that Leontius regarded Origenist speculation 
as perfectly acceptable because it did not affect the core tenets of the Christian faith 
but that he did not himself engage in it.5 
This interpretation seems to be confirmed by close analysis of the first section 
of Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos where Leontius attempts to show that the 
formula of Chalcedon does not contradict commonly accepted notions about the 
order of being. As I have argued in a recent article Leontius builds his theory 
entirely on Aristotelian foundations and deliberately excludes the Platonic theory 
that universals have an existence outside individual instantiations.6 It is evident that 
such a conceptual framework is difficult to reconcile with the conventional portrayal 
of Origenism as an intellectual current heavily influenced by Plato’s philosophy. 
However, it must not be forgotten that Leontius’ highly original ontological 
discussions take up only the first section of Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos. The 
remainder of the treatise focuses almost exclusively on the analogy between the 
incarnated Word and the human compound. Leontius mentions several Nestorian 
and Monophysite objections to the use of the anthropological paradigm and in each 
case attempts to show that they are not valid. This raises the question: why would 
he have expended so much energy on this matter after he had already established a 
viable framework for the incarnation? One answer lies without doubt in the 
conventions of the Christological discourse where the ability to produce analogies 
for the incarnation of the Word was of great significance because it demonstrated 
that a particular Christology was not just a flight of fancy. However, anthropological 
statements could also be made for their own sake. In an article about a Nestorian 
Christological treatise from the late sixth or early seventh century I have sought to 
demonstrate that the anonymous author of this text used the analogy between the 
incarnated Word and the human being as a means to set out his own views about 
                                                 
4 The interpretation of D. Evans, Leontius of Byzantium: An Origenist Christology (Washington, 
1970), has been conclusively disproved by B. Daley, ‘The Origenism of Leontius of Byzantium’, 
Journal of Theological Studies, n.s. 27 (1976), pp. 333-369. Evans had argued that the term 'Christ' 
signified the pre-existent soul of the Word. However, the term simply refers to the compound made 
up of Word on the one hand and human soul and body on the other. 
5 Loofs, Leontius von Byzanz, p. 293, drew the attention to a passage in Cyril of Scythopolis’ 
Life of Cyriacus where Origenist monks argue that speculation about the world and the souls does 
not touch on the central tenets of the Christian faith and should therefore not be policed by the 
official church, cf. E. Schwartz, Kyrillos von Skythopolis (Leipzig, 1939), p. 229, ll. 24-31. He 
suggested that Leontius might have held such a view. This interpretation was accepted by 
Hombergen, Second Origenist Controversy, pp. 157-164; and also by Daley, ‘Origenism’, p. 369. 
6 D. Krausmüller, ‘Making Sense of the Formula of Chalcedon: the Cappadocians and Aristotle 
in Leontius of Byzantium’s Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos’, Vigiliae Christianae 65 (2011), pp. 
484-513. 
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the human being and to polemicise against an alternative anthropology that was 
being propagated by his adversaries.7 
In what follows I will make the case that Leontius, too, pursued such a twofold 
agenda when he wrote his treatise Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos and that he 
constructed his arguments in such a way that the specifically Origenist notion of a 
pre-existent soul is implied. My focus will be on the first Nestorian objection to the 
applicability of the anthropological paradigm and on Leontius’ response to it. I will 
discuss all parts of the argument because in such a dense text every single sentence 
may well be crucial for a proper understanding of Leontius’ position. By contrast, 
I will only adduce material from other parts of Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos 
and from Leontius’ later treatise Solutiones if they can help to clarify the meaning 
of the passage under discussion. The Nestorian objection reads as follows: 
 
Ἀλλ’ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, φασίν, εἰ καὶ ἐξ ἑτεροειδῶν συνέστηκεν, ἀλλ’ οὖν οὐδ’ ὁπότερον 
αὐτῶν δίχα θατέρου τὸ εἶναι ἔσχηκεν, ὁ δὲ Λόγος ἔστι καὶ πρὸ τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος· 
καὶ ὁ μὲν ἐξ ἀτελῶν συνέστηκε μερῶν, ὁ δὲ Χριστὸς τέλεια ἔχει τὰ μέρη καὶ ταύτῃ 
οὐδὲ μέρη ἂν εἰκότως καλοῖντο. Πῶς τοίνυν τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κρᾶμα ἐπί τε τοῦ 
Λόγου καὶ τῆς σαρκώσεως λαμβάνεις, μηδὲν ἐοικός;8 
 
But, they say, even if the human being is made up of (sc. entities) that belong to 
different species, neither of them has its being without the other, whereas the Word 
exists even before the humanity, and the former one is made up of incomplete parts 
whereas Christ has parts that are complete and that should therefore properly not even 
be called parts. How, then, do you apply the human mixture to the Word and the 
incarnation, when it is utterly dissimilar? 
 
The Nestorian argument hinges on the dissimilarity between the divine Word on 
the one hand and the human soul on the other. It is evident that this argument could 
be countered most effectively through the claim that the soul, too, exists as a 
complete self-sufficient being before its composition with the body. As is well 
known such an alternative anthropology had indeed been proposed by Origen and 
Evagrius who spoke of a monad of pre-existing minds, which then fell away from 
God and were joined with bodies. However, we wait in vain for Leontius to proclaim 
his Origenist beliefs. Instead, he declares that he employs the anthropological 
paradigm not ‘because of the pre-existence or simultaneous existence ... of the parts’ 
(διὰ τὸ προϋπάρχειν ἢ συνυπάρχειν … τῶν μερῶν) but only because the human being 
is an example of an unconfused union of two natures with diametrically opposite 
sets of qualities.9 This statement has been interpreted by modern scholars in radically 
different ways. Friedrich Loofs has suggested that Leontius deliberately sidesteps 
                                                 
7 D. Krausmüller, ‘Conflicting anthropologies in the Christological discourse at the end of Late 
Antiquity: the case of Leontius of Jerusalem’s Nestorian adversary’, Journal of Theological Studies 
56 (2005), pp. 413-447.  
8 CNE, PG 86, 1280B11- C6, ed. Daley, p. 9, l. 21–p. 10, l. 2. 
9 CNE, PG, 86, 1280D4-6; ed. Daley, p. 10, l. 12. 
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the issue and thus leaves open the possibility that the soul is indeed pre-existent, 
just as the Word is.10 In contrast, Brian Daley and more recently Daniel Hombergen 
have argued that Leontius makes a concession to his adversaries and admits that in 
these respects the two cases do indeed differ.11 In order to decide which of these 
interpretations is correct we first of all need to gain a better understanding of the 
Nestorian position with which Leontius is confronted. 
No Nestorian texts from the first half of the sixth century have survived. 
Fortunately, however, this gap can be filled through recourse to the writings of 
earlier Antiochene theologians. Of particular relevance are the Confutationes of 
Eutherius of Tyana, a contemporary and friend of Nestorius. This treatise contains 
the following statement about the use of the anthropological paradigm: 
 
Ἄνθρωπος μὲν γὰρ ἐκ ψυχῆς νοητῆς καὶ σώματος αἰσθητοῦ ζῷον γνωρίζεται εἰκότως 
διὰ τὸ μηδέτερον χωρὶς τοῦ ἑτέρου προάγουσαν ἔχειν ὑπόστασιν μηδὲ σῴζειν τὸν 
ὅρον τῆς φύσεως κατὰ ταὐτὸν μὲν ἀρχὴν τοῦ εἶναι λαβόντα ἐκ γαστρὸς καὶ οὕτως 
εἰς τὸν βίον ἐρχόμενα, ἑνὸς δὲ ζῴου σύστασιν ἐργαζόμενα. ὁδὲκύριος Ἰησοῦς οὐκ ἐξ 
ἀτελῶν πραγμάτων τὸ εἶναι δέχεται, ἀλλὰ τελείων φύσεων ἐν ἑαυτῷ σύνοδον 
δείκνυσι· κἀκεῖ μὲν μέρη ἀνρθώπου ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα, ἐνταῦθα δὲ οὔτε ἡ σὰρξ μέρος 
τοῦ Λόγου οὔτε ὁ Λόγος μέρος τῆς σαρκός. … πῶς οὖν κέχρηνται τῷδε τῷ 
ὑποδείγματι μηδὲν ὅμοιον ἔχοντι;12 
 
For a human being is justly recognised as a living being made up of an intelligible 
soul and a sensible body because neither has a pre-existing hypostasis without the 
other nor preserves the definition of nature since they have received the beginning of 
their being simultaneously in the womb, and have thus come into this life and brought 
about the constitution of one living being. By contrast, the Lord Jesus does not receive 
his being out of incomplete things, but shows the concourse of complete natures in 
him. And in the former case soul and body (sc. are) parts of a human being, whereas 
in the latter case the flesh is not part of the Word and the Word is not part of the flesh. 
… How, then, do they use this paradigm when it has not similar features? 
 
It is immediately evident that this argument is almost identical with the Nestorian 
objection in Leontius’ treatise. This leaves no doubt that Leontius is engaging in a 
real debate, and even raises the possibility that he quotes from a lost Nestorian text. 
However, this is not the only conclusion that we can draw from Eutherius’ treatise: 
it also helps us to make better sense of Leontius’ counter-argument. The invective 
against the use of the anthropological paradigm appears at the very end of the 
Confutationes and was evidently added as a post-script to an already existing 
                                                 
10 Loofs states that the pre-existence of the soul is ‘zum mindesten nicht ausgeschlossen’, cf. 
Loofs, Leontius von Byzanz, p. 295. 
11 Cf. Daley, ‘Origenism’, p. 356: ‘In matters of anthropology, it seems, Leontius has no quarrel 
with other non-Origenists’; and Hombergen, Second Origenist Controversy, p. 16.  
12 Eutherius of Tyana, Confutationes, ed. M. Tetz, Eine Anthologie des Eutherios von Tyana 
(Patristische Texte und Studien, 1; Berlin, 1964), p. 44, ll. 2-8.  
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manuscript. This addition was most likely prompted by the position of Apollinaris 
of Laodicea who had argued that like the human being the incarnated Word was 
one nature compounded of incomplete parts where the Word took the place of the 
human mind.13 In the earlier sections of his treatise Eutherius takes a rather different 
stance. There he is willing to employ the anthropological paradigm in order to 
illustrate his own Antiochene Christology: he points out that the human being is 
one and nevertheless two unconfused natures with their own diametrically opposed 
characteristics.14 It is evident that this older, unselfconscious use of the analogy 
between Christ and the human being is virtually identical with the position that 
Leontius claims to take. Since Leontius points out that the anthropological 
paradigm had been used in the Christological discourse for a very long time it could 
be argued that he appeals in an oblique way to older Antiochene authors against the 
position of contemporary Nestorians.15 Accordingly, one could conclude that 
Leontius did not wish to drop a useful analogy only because the Monophysites 
misused it.16 This seems to support Daley’s and Hombergen’s contention that 
Leontius’ refusal to speak about the temporal dimension cannot be taken as a sign 
of his Origenism. 
However, a different picture emerges when we subject Leontius’ argument to 
careful analysis. I will start by looking more closely at the passage in which he 
juxtaposes the two cases of pre-existence and simultaneous existence. It reads as 
follows:  
 
Οὐ μὴν τὸ παράδειγμα καλῶς γε ποιοῦσιν, ἐκβιάζοντες οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς τὸ 
πρωτότυπον. Οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἂν εἴη παράδειγμα εἰ μὴ καὶ τὸ ἀπεοικὸς ἔχοι. Ἡμεῖς τὸν 
ἄνθρωπον οὔτε διὰ τὸ προϋπάρχειν ἢ συνυπάρχειν οὔτε διὰ τὸ ἀτελὲς τῶν μερῶν· 
συγκεχωρεῖσθαι γὰρ τοῖς κακοσχόλοις ἀτελῆ λέγειν καίπερ οὐκ ὄντα κατὰ τὸν τοῦ 
εἶναι λόγον ὡς ὕστερον δείξομεν· ἀλλὰ πρὸς δήλωσιν εἰλήφαμεν παράδειγμα τοῦ 
αὐτῇ τῇ οὐσίᾳ τὸν Λόγον ἡνῶσθαι τῷ ἐξ ἡμῶν σώματι.17 
 
However, they do not use the paradigm properly, forcing it to be identical with the 
prototype, for it would no longer be a paradigm if it did not also have something that 
was unlike (sc. the prototype). We use the human being as a paradigm neither because 
of the pre-existence or simultaneous existence nor because of the incompleteness of 
the parts – for it may be conceded to the ill-willed ones to call them incomplete even 
if they are not so according to the definition of being as we will show afterwards – 
but in order to show that the Word has been united with the body from us in its very 
substance. 
 
                                                 
13 For Apollinaris, cf. H. de Riedmatten, ‘La christologie d’ Apollinaire de Laodicée’, Studia 
Patristica, 2 (Texte und Untersuchungen, 64, Berlin, 1957), pp. 208-234. 
14 Eutherius, Confutationes, ed. Tetz, p. 12, ll. 21-28. 
15 CNE, PG 86, 1280C11-15, ed. Daley, p. 10, ll. 6-8.   
16 CNE, PG 86, 1280C8-11, ed. Daley, p. 10, ll. 4-6. 
17 CNE, PG 86, 1280C15-1281A2, ed. Daley, p. 10, ll. 11-16. 
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In this passage Leontius rejects his adversaries’ claim that the human being could 
only serve as an analogy for the incarnated Word if one part were pre-existent and 
both parts were complete. He claims that paradigms can include divergent features, 
which are left aside in the comparison, and then applies this general rule to the 
specific case of the human paradigm. At first sight it appears that Leontius has set 
out a coherent argument. However, a closer look at the phrase ‘neither because of 
the pre-existence or simultaneous existence … of the parts’ (οὔτε διὰ τὸ προϋπάρχειν 
ἢ συνυπάρχειν ...τῶν μερῶν) reveals an inconsistency. The general framework that 
Leontius has established would only have required the phrase ‘not because of 
simultaneous existence’ (οὔτε διὰ τὸ συνυπάρχειν), parallel to the following ‘not 
because of the incompleteness of the parts’ (οὔτε διὰ τὸ ἀτελὲς τῶν μερῶν), because 
according to the Nestorian these are the aspects in which the human being differs 
from the incarnated Word.18 However, Leontius has added the alternative ‘not 
because of pre-existence’ (οὔτε διὰ τὸ προϋπάρχειν), which makes no sense in the 
context because it would establish a strict parallel between the soul and the divine 
Word and should therefore be considered in the comparison. It can be ruled out that 
this inconsistency simply escaped Leontius’ notice because he chooses words and 
expressions with the utmost care. Therefore we must ask: why did Leontius introduce 
the notion of pre-existence into his argument? 
In order to find an answer we need to turn to the parallel theme of the 
completeness or incompleteness of parts. As we have seen Leontius mentions in 
this case only the diverging feature as is required by his conceptual framework. 
However, this is not his last word on the topic. In a lengthy parenthesis he states: 
‘for it may be conceded to the ill-willed ones to call them incomplete even if they 
are not so according to the definition of being’ (συγκεχωρεῖσθαι γὰρ τοῖς 
κακοσχόλοις ἀτελῆ λέγειν καίπερ οὐκ ὄντα κατὰ τὸν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον), and then 
announces that he will provide proof for his contention in the following section.19 
When we turn to this section we find that Leontius accepts the incompleteness of 
body and soul only in the most formal sense, pointing out that neither of them is the 
complete human being and that they can therefore be considered incomplete parts 
of a whole.20 Accordingly he feels no qualms to apply this framework to the 
incarnated Word as well: 
 
Τέλειος μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὁ Λόγος, καὶ πλήρης, καὶ παρεκτικὸς τελειότητος· τελεία δὲ 
καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ψυχή, ὡς πρὸς τὸν ὅρον τῆς ὑπάρξεως. Ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ὁ Λόγος 
τέλειος Χριστός, κἂν τέλειος εἴη θεός, μὴ τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος αὐτῷ συντεταγμένης· 
                                                 
18 This interpretation is confirmed through a further example from Trinitarian theology, which 
Leontius offers to his readers: the sun and its radiance are used as analogy for the Father and the 
Son, despite the fact that the radiance is ‘without a hypostasis’ (ἀνυπόστατον), which is therefore 
not considered in the comparison. Cf. CNE, PG 86, 1281A14-B3, ed. Daley, p. 10, ll. 26-28. 
19 CNE, PG 86, 1280D5-8, ed. Daley, p. 10, ll. 13-14. 
20 CNE, PG 86, 1281B7-10, ed. Daley, p. 10, ll. 21-31. 
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οὔτε ἡ ψυχὴ τέλειος ἄνθρωπος, κἂν τελείαν ἔχει οὐσίαν, μὴ τοῦ σώματος αὐτῇ 
συνεπινοουμένου.21 
 
For the Word is complete, and full, and purveyor of completeness, and complete is 
also the soul of the human being, as regards the definition of existence. But neither 
is the Word the complete Christ, even if he is complete God, when the humanity is 
not correlated with it, nor is the soul a complete human being, even if it has a complete 
substance, when the body is not considered with it. 
 
Here Leontius takes a view that is radically different from the Nestorian position: 
rather than juxtaposing the complete parts of the incarnated Word with the incomplete 
parts of the human being, he declares that both the Word and the soul can be 
regarded as both complete and incomplete. It is evident that we have come a long 
way from Leontius’ earlier protestations that the human being can only serve as an 
analogy for the incarnated Word because it is not completely like it: now Word and 
soul are presented as two specific applications of a general framework, which 
reduces the difference between them to nothing.22 
This modification raises questions about the validity of Leontius’ earlier statement 
concerning the parallel temporal aspect. As we have seen there, too, he states that 
he will not consider this aspect, thereby implying that there is a difference between 
the human being and Christ, but then mentions pre-existence, which would create 
a strict parallel between the soul and the divine Word. Thus one could argue that in 
both cases Leontius makes a show of accepting his adversary’s position but at the 
same time provides his readers with clues that for him the analogy is much stricter 
than it first seems. Indeed, the very fact that he mentions pre-existence as an option 
alongside simultaneous existence is significant. After all, Gregory of Nyssa had 
introduced simultaneous coming-to-be explicitly as the orthodox alternative to 
Origenism and sixth-century authors such as Severus of Antioch and Pamphilus 
were still insisting that only the latter theory was acceptable.23 
So far we have focused on the first part of Leontius’ statement, which purports 
to list dissimilarities between the human being and the incarnated Word. Now we 
need to turn to the second part in which Leontius sets out his own understanding of 
the anthropological paradigm. There he claims that he will employ it exclusively in 
order to illustrate ‘that the Word is united with the body from us in its very 
substance’ (τοῦ αὐτῇ τῇ οὐσίᾳ τὸν Λόγον ἡνῶσθαι τῷ ἐξ ἡμῶν σώματι).24 This is a 
                                                 
21 CNE, PG 86, 1281C12-D4, ed. Daley, p. 11, ll. 12-17. 
22 Daley is not aware of this reinterpretation of the topic of incompleteness. Accordingly, he 
adduces Leontius’ apparent concession that in the case of incompleteness archetype and paradigm 
do indeed differ as evidence for Leontius’ supposed acceptance of simultaneous existence. Cf. 
Daley, ‘Origenism’, p. 356: ‘Leontius concedes these two objections, saying that every analogy 
limps.’ 
23 Cf. D. Krausmüller,‘Anti-Origenism and the “Sleep of the Soul” in Seventh- to Ninth-Century 
Byzantium’, in R. Young and J. Kalvesmaki (eds.), Evagrius and His Legacy, forthcoming in 2014. 
24 CNE, PG 86, 1281A1-2, ed. Daley, p. 10, ll. 15-16.  
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strikingly odd characterisation of the incarnation since it only considers one part of 
the human compound. Instead one would have expected him to use the phrase ‘that 
the Word is united with the human being from us’ (τὸν Λόγον ἡνῶσθαι τῷ ἐξ ἡμῶν 
ἀνθρώπῳ), which would also have included the soul. It can be ruled out that 
Leontius believed the divine Word to have assumed only a human body. Such a 
view would have been heretical and in any case a few lines further down the 
‘common human being out of soul and body’ (κοινὸς ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ 
σώματος) is compared with the ‘Saviour out of divinity and humanity’ (Σωτὴρ ὁ ἐκ 
θεότητος καὶ ἀνθρωπότητος), which makes an ‘Apollinarian’ reading of his 
statement impossible.25 In order to understand Leontius’ true intentions we need to 
consider that τὸν Λόγον ἡνῶσθαι τῷ σώματι has an exact counterpart in τὴν ψυχὴν 
ἡνῶσθαι τῷ σώματι, which refers to ordinary human beings. The significance of 
this parallel between Word and soul reveals itself when we look at the context. 
Leontius avers that in the union of Word and body both components are not 
confused but preserve their differences, just as is the case with the human being, 
and then adds the following explanation:  
 
Οὔτε γὰρ ἐξ ἀοράτου ἢ ἀθανάτου ὁρατὴ καὶ θνητὴ γέγονεν ἡ ἡμετέρα ψυχὴ οὔτε μὴν 
ὁ Λόγος ὁρατὸς ἢ θνητὸς καίπερ ἐν ὁρατῷ καὶ θνητῷ σώματι τῆς τε ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς 
καὶ τοῦ Λόγου γεγενημένων.26 
 
Neither has our soul turned from being invisible and immortal into being visible and 
mortal nor indeed has the Word become visible or mortal, although both our soul and 
the Word have come to be found in a visible and mortal body. 
 
Here Leontius juxtaposes both the divine Word and the human soul with the 
human body, with the consequence that the Word and the soul again appear to be 
two strictly parallel cases. Such a configuration is possible because Leontius focuses 
on two qualities that the divine Word shares with the human soul but not with the 
human body. This gives the impression as if the union of the divine Word and the 
human soul were a straightforward matter where both entities are at the same 
ontological level and thus compatible. It is evident that such a view is highly 
problematic within a Christian conceptual framework.27 
In the section of Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos that follows the passage 
under discussion Leontius modifies the straightforward parallel that he has created 
between the Word and the soul. There he deals with another objection to the use of 
the anthropological paradigm, namely that the soul is circumscribed by the body 
                                                 
25 CNE, PG 86, 1281A9-12, ed. Daley, p. 11, ll. 21-24.  
26 CNE, PG 86, 1281A5-9, ed. Daley, p. 10, ll. 18-21.  
27 It should be pointed out that Leontius’ statement is reconcilable with an Origenist Christology. 
By focusing on the composition of the Word with the body he leaves it open when the soul was 
compounded with the Word. This might have happened at the incarnation but could also have 
happened before all time. 
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and suffers through it and that the incarnated Word would therefore also become 
‘passible and circumscribed’ (παθητὸς καὶ περιγραπτός).28 Here we find the same 
direct juxtaposition between the Word and the body as before since Leontius 
considers the case that the Word might become circumscribed and passible ‘through 
the union with the circumscribed and passible body’ (διὰτὴν πρὸς τὸ περιγραπτόν 
καὶ παθητὸν σῶμα ἕνωσιν).29 However, now Leontius also makes a distinction 
between Word and soul. He argues that the soul itself is passible ‘because it has 
received passible faculties that are combined with it for its benefit’ (παθητικὰς πρὸς 
τὸ αὐτῇ συμφέρον συναρμοσθείσας λαβοῦσα) and therefore suffers with the body 
to which it is bound whereas the divine Word is by nature impassible ‘even if it 
appears in a body’ (κἂν ἐν σώματι γένηται).30 Yet nowhere in Contra Nestorianos 
et Eutychianos is there any mention of the most fundamental difference that 
separates the Word from both body and soul, namely that the former is ‘uncreated’ 
(ἄκτιστος) whereas the latter are ‘created’ (κτιστός).31 There can be no doubt that 
this is a conscious omission. Later in the text Leontius deals with the objection that 
if the human body and soul are two natures in one hypostasis there should be three 
natures in the incarnated Word.32 
This objection was countered by other Chalcedonians with the argument that body 
and soul are both part of created nature and thus should count as one nature when 
juxtaposed with the uncreated Word.33 In contrast, Leontius makes no reference to 
this argument but develops an alternative strategy in order to solve the problem.34 
The testimony of his later treatise Solutiones is even more striking. There he 
informs his Monophysite adversaries that Christ cannot be one nature because a 
nature cannot be at the same time ‘visible and invisible, mortal and immortal, 
circumscribed and boundless, and generally generate and ingenerate’ (ὁρατὴ καὶ 
ἀόρατος, θνητὴ καὶ ἀθάνατος, περιγραπτὴ καὶ ἀόριστος, καὶ συνόλως γενητὴ καὶ 
ἀγένητος).35 This list is highly instructive: the first three juxtapositions where the 
first term refers to the body alone have close counterparts in Contra Nestorianos et 
Eutychianos whereas the last distinction where the first term refers to the soul as 
well, is entirely absent there. These findings confirm our previous interpretation: 
while apparently presenting the two views that the soul existed before the body and 
that it came into existence together with the body merely as two alternatives without 
                                                 
28 CNE, PG 86, 1284B13, ed. Daley, p. 12, l. 16.   
29 CNE, PG 86, 1284B11-12, ed. Daley, p. 12, l. 15. 
30 CNE, PG 86, 1284D11-13, C1-2, ed. Daley, p. 13, l. 11-12, p. 12, ll. 17-18. 
31 Leontius of Jerusalem, Contra Nestorianos, I.26, PG 86, 1492D4-5. 
32 CNE, PG 86, 1293B11-C1, ed. Daley, p. 20, ll. 17-21. 
33 Cf. U. Lang, John Philoponus and the Controversies over Chalcedon in the Sixth Century. A 
Study and Translation of the Arbiter (Spicilegium sacrum Lovaniense, 47; Leuven, 2001), pp. 73-75. 
34 CNE, PG 86, 1293C14-1297C4, ed. Daley, p. 20, l. 22-p. 23, l. 21. 
35 Solutiones, PG 86, 1944B6-8, ed. Daley, p. 95, ll. 12-13. 
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committing himself to either of them, Leontius creates a context that insinuates the 
correctness of the former point of view.  
Further confirmation that Leontius considered the soul to be ingenerate comes 
from the immediately following passage, which focuses on the completeness or 
incompleteness of parts. Introducing the human being as an example, Leontius 
points out that body and soul are complete ‘as regards the definition of being’ (κατὰ 
τὸν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον) and incomplete only ‘in relation to the definition of the whole 
human being’ (ὡς πρὸς τὸν ὅρον τοῦ ὅλου ἀνθρώπου).36 In order to understand this 
argument we need to realise that it was formulated against an existing Nestorian 
position. Again it is Eutherius of Tyana who helps us to reconstruct the context. 
Eutherius first states that ‘before the union’ (πρὸ τῆς ἑνώσεως) both Word and flesh 
had complete natures ‘so that nothing at all was lacking either in the divinity or in 
the humanity as regards their own definitions’ (ὡς μηδὲν ὅλως λείπειν μήτε τῇ 
θεότητι εἰς τὸν ἴδιον λόγον μήτε τῇ ἀνθρωπότητι).37 Then he claims that both body 
and soul are instead incomplete ‘parts of one person’ (μέρη ἑνὸς προσώπου) 
because each of them has only one part of the definition of the human being.38 In 
order to support his argument he points out that ‘those who are knowledgeable in 
these matters define the human being as a rational mortal living being, deriving 
“rational” from the soul and inferring “mortal” from the body’ (ὁρίζονται γοῦν τὸν 
ἄνθρωπον οἱ περὶ ταῦτα δεινοὶ ζῷον λογικὸν θνητόν, τὸ μὲν λογικὸν ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς 
ἑρμηνεύοντες, τὸ δὲ θνητὸν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος ἀποφαίνοντες).39 
Such formulae, which define a species through a combination of an overarching 
genus and specific differences, were ultimately derived from Aristotle’s Categories 
but had been popularised through Porphyry’s Isagage. Leontius is, of course, 
familiar with this conceptual framework: at the end of his later treatise Solutiones 
he lists as characteristics of the human being ‘animal, rational, mortal, and receptive 
of opposites in its parts’ (τὸ ζῷον, τὸ λογικόν, τὸ θνητόν, τὸ τῶν ἐναντίων ἀνὰ 
μέρος δεκτικόν) and adds that this is ‘the infallible definition of its substance’ (ὁ 
ἄπταιστος τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ ὅρος);40 and earlier in the same treatise he explains that 
‘the particular definitions of each thing’ (οἱ ἴδιοι ἑκάστου πράγματος ὅροι) are 
arrived at by adding to the highest genera ‘substance’ (οὐσία) and ‘animal’ (ζῷον) 
specific differences such as ‘corporeal’ (ἐνσώματον) and ‘incorporeal’ (ἀσώματον), 
and ‘rational’ (λογικόν) and ‘irrational’ (ἄλογον).41 Therefore one would have 
expected him to modify the Aristotelian definition by creating complementary 
terms for ‘rational’ and ‘mortal’ because this would have permitted him to claim 
that the rational and immortal soul and the irrational and mortal body were separate 
                                                 
36 CNE, PG 86, 1281B7-10, ed. Daley, p. 10, ll. 29-31.  
37 Eutherius, Confutationes, ed. Tetz, p. 44, ll. 9-11. 
38 Eutherius, Confutationes, ed. Tetz, p. 44, ll. 19-21. 
39 Eutherius, Confutationes, ed. Tetz, p. 44, ll. 18-21. 
40 Solutiones, PG 86, 1945B9-11, ed. Daley, p. 96, l. 28.  
41 Solutiones, PG 86, 1921D1-6, ed. Daley, p. 81, ll. 5-12. 
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species characterised through a combination of genus and specific differences. 
However, this is not the case as can be seen from Leontius’ response: 
 
Τί γὰρ λείποι τῇ ψυχῇ χωριστὴν ἐχούσῃ καὶ ἰδίαν ζωήν, πρὸς τὸ εἶναι οὐσίαν 
ἀσώματον αὐτοκίνητον; τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτῆς δηλοῖ καὶ τὸ ἀθάνατον καὶ τὸ ἀνώλεθρον.42 
 
For what would be lacking in the soul, which has its separable and own life, in order 
for it to be an incorporeal and self-moved substance? For this is indicated by its 
immortality and indestructibility.  
 
It is evident that Leontius does not give his readers a complete ‘definition of 
being’ (ὅρος τοῦ εἶναι) of the soul because the formula ‘incorporeal substance’ 
(οὐσία ἀσώματος) is not complemented with the crucial specific difference 
‘rational’ (λογική).43 By contrast, the quality ‘immortal’ (ἀθάνατος) does appear. 
Yet rather than presenting his readers with the straightforward formula ‘incorporeal 
immortal substance’ (οὐσία ἀσώματος ἀθάνατος) he introduces the further 
characteristic ‘self-moving’ (αὐτοκίνητος) and explains only in a second step that 
the immortality of the soul is a consequence of this particular feature. 
The reason for these modifications reveals itself when we realise that Leontius’ 
definition of the soul is based on the famous proof of the immortality of the soul in 
Plato’s dialogue Phaedrus. There Plato argues that the soul is immortal because it 
is ever-moving and that it is ever-moving because it is not moved from the outside 
but by itself.44 Further study shows that Leontius is dependent on Late Antique 
doxographical texts. There Plato’s views about the soul are usually summarised as 
‘intelligible substance, which is moveable from itself’ (οὐσία νοητή, ἐξ ἑαυτῆς 
κινητική).45 However, this definition is sometimes rephrased as ‘incorporeal self-
moved substance’ (οὐσία ἀσώματος αὐτοκίνητος) in order to make it resemble 
more closely Aristotelian definitions of being consisting of genus and specific 
differences.46 It is this modified formula that Leontius has adopted, no doubt because 
it allowed him to shift almost imperceptibly from one framework to the other. 
The implications of this shift are evident. Despite his earlier protestations 
Leontius does not make the case that the soul has a complete set of substantial 
qualities, which can be considered by the mind in isolation from the compound. 
Instead he demonstrates that the soul is complete as a living being within the human 
compound and that it has an actual independent existence outside the body after its 
separation from it. Thus he introduces the temporal dimension into an argument 
                                                 
42 CNE, PG 86, 1281B10-13, ed. Daley, p. 10, l. 3–p. 12, l. 2. 
43 Cf. CNE, PG 86, 1296C10, ed. Daley, p. 22, l. 9:οὐσία λογικὴ καὶ ποιότης ἀσώματος.   
44 Plato, Phaedrus, 245c-e. 
45 Cf. Nemesius of Emesa, De natura hominis, II.68, ed. M. Morani (Leipzig, 1987), p. 17, ll. 3-
4, with references to doxographical texts in the apparatus. 
46 Pseudo-Galen, Definitiones medicae, 29, ed. K. G. Kühn, Opera omnia, 20 vols. (Leipzig, 
1821-1833), vol. XIX, p. 355ö ll. 11-12: Ψυχή ἐστιν οὐσία ἀσώματος αὐτοκίνητος κατὰ Πλάτωνα. 
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that at first sight seems to consider only the parallel theme of completeness. At this 
point one might conclude that Leontius is only concerned with the afterlife.47 
However, as is well known Plato had argued that in order for the soul to be immortal 
it must be without beginning because if it had been produced by some other entity 
it would have been moved by it and would therefore not be self-moving. Of course, 
in Leontius’ text the crucial term ‘ingenerate’ (ἀγένητος) does not appear. However, 
one can argue that this aspect is implied, in particular since Leontius uses the term 
‘indestructible’ (ἀνώλεθρος), which in philosophical literature is regularly 
complemented with ingenerate: Proclus, for example, states that Plato ‘in his 
Phaedrus … showed the soul to be ingenerate and indestructible’ (ἀγένητον … καὶ 
ἀνώλεθρον ἔδειξεν ἐν Φαίδρῳ τὴν ψυχήν).48 In itself such an argument may not be 
considered conclusive. However, at this point we need to remember that in the 
immediately preceding paragraph Leontius had studiously avoided to juxtapose the 
ingenerate divine Word with the generated human soul. Thus one can hypothesise 
that contemporary readers would already have been sensitised to this topic and 
would therefore have realised that with his recourse to Plato, Leontius was 
signalling his belief that the soul is ingenerate.49 
Indeed, it can be argued that the very mention of the concept of self-movement 
was sufficient to conjure up the notion of pre-existence. After all, the implications 
of this concept were well known to Christian authors.50 Cyril of Alexandria, for 
example, states bluntly in his Contra Iulianum that ‘nothing is … self-moved but 
everything is produced by him (sc. God), and appears to have received the 
movement from non-being to being’ (αὐτοκίνητον … οὐδέν, παρῆκται δὲ τὰ πάντα 
παρ’ αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι κίνησιν λαχόντα φαίνεται).51 Cyril 
                                                 
47 Cf. Hombergen, Second Origenist Controversy, p. 163, concludes: ‘For Leontius, the 
independence of the soul does not imply its pre-existence, but it appears connected with its 
immortality.’ 
48 Proclus Diadochus, In Platonis Timaeum Commentaria, ed. E. Diehl, vol. 1-3 (Leipzig, 1904), 
vol. II, p. 117, ll. 12-13. 
49 Cf. Loofs, Leontius von Byzanz, p. 296: ‘Endlich ist darauf aufmerksam zu machen, dass bei 
Leontius die menschliche Seele so sehr als selbständiges Wesen erscheint, daß es, auch wenn 
Leontius kein προϋπάρχειν derselben angenommen hat, dennoch sehr begreiflich wäre, daß Gegner 
diese Annahme ihm unterstellt hatten.’ 
50 Christian authors tend to use the term usually only to express that the human being is an 
independent agent, endowed with free will. The most famous example of this use is found in the 
writings of Apollinaris of Laodicea who juxtaposed the changeable αὐτοκίνητον of human beings 
with the ταὐτοκίνητον of God. Apollinaris was certainly no Platonist: he insisted strongly that the 
life of the soul is entirely dependent on God’s will, cf. [224], Ps 118, 50, ed. E.Mühlenberg, 
Psalmenkommentare aus der Katenenüberlieferung, vol. 1-3 (Patristische Texte und 
Untersuchungen, 15, 16, 19, Berlín and New York, 1975-78), I, p. 88, ll. 1-14. 
51 Cyril of Alexandria, Contra Iulianum, I.2, ed. F. Diekamp, Analecta patristica (Orientalia 
Christiana Analecta, 117; Rome, 1938; repr. 1962), pp. 228-29, cf. D. Krausmüller, ‘Faith and 
Reason in Late Antiquity: the Perishability Axiom and Its Impact on Christian Views about the 
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was attacking pagan Platonists but a similar line seems to have been taken in anti-
Origenist texts. In his Ambigua Maximus points out to the Origenists that the 
rational soul is not ‘self-movement’ (αὐτοκινησία) because it ‘suffers being moved’ 
(πάσχει τὸ κινεῖσθαι) just like all other ‘generate beings’ (γενητά);52 and the 
anonymous Nestorian author whose work is preserved in Leontius’ of Jerusalem’s 
Contra Nestorianos states that self-movement should be attributed not to the soul 
but to the human compound in order to rule out the possibility that the soul might 
have existed before the body.53 
At this point one could object that were the proposed interpretation correct, 
Leontius would have made no distinction between human souls and God at all. Yet 
this was certainly not the case. Even pagan Platonic philosophers regarded the soul 
as an effect of a higher principle,54 and the Christian Platonist John of Scythopolis, 
a contemporary of Leontius, states in his scholia to the Pseudo-Dionysian De divinis 
nominibus that the souls are brought forth by God and that they can be called 
‘ingenerate’ (ἀγένητα) only in the sense that they have come into being before 
time.55 However, there can be no doubt that in the sixth century even such a qualified 
ingeneracy was completely unacceptable for mainstream Christians. Moreover, 
nuances were regularly overlooked in polemical writings so that John could be 
attacked as a Manichean who believed that the souls were parts of God from whom 
they had broken away.56 Thus one can argue that Leontius sought to avoid such 
attacks by formulating a statement that implied pre-existence but did not explicitly 
affirm it. 
So far we have focused on the first part of Leontius’ response to the Nestorian 
objections. As we have seen this part seems at a first glance only to deal with the 
parallel theme of completeness and incompleteness. However, by deftly 
manipulating his arguments Leontius has managed to introduce the temporal aspect 
and thus to signal to his readers that he considers the soul to exist independently 
before its composition with the body. Now we need to turn to the second part of 
Leontius’ response in which he makes overt statements about the temporal aspect. 
The first argument reads as follows:  
 
                                                 
Origin and Nature of the Soul’, in J. Dillon & M. El-Kaisy (ed.), The Afterlife of the Soul: Platonist 
Theories of the Soul in Christianity, Judaism and Islam (Leiden, 2009), pp. 47-67, esp. p. 51. 
52 Maximus, Ambigua, PG 91, 1073B14-C2. 
53 Leontius of Jerusalem, Contra Nestorianos, I.51, PG 86, 1513B8-D1. 
54 Cf. e.g. Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum Commentaria, ed. Diehl, vol. 2, p. 117, ll. 11-14: ἔστι 
δὲ γένεσις ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐχ ἡ κατὰ χρόνον …, ἀλλ’ ἡ κατ’ οὐσίαν πάροδος ἀπὸ τῶν νοητῶν αἰτίων. 
55 Cf. John of Scythopolis, Scholia in Scholia in Dionysii Areopagitae librum de Divinis 
Nominibus, PG 4, 373A6-C9.For a discussion cf. D. Krausmüller, ‘Faith and Reason in Late 
Antiquity’, pp. 64-65. 
56 Cf. Basil the Cilician, Contra Johannem Scythopolitanum, summarised in Photius’ 
Bibliotheca, codex 107, p. 87a34 - p. 88b14, ed. R. Henry, vol. 1-7 (Paris, 1959-1977), vol. II, pp. 
74-78. 
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Καὶ τοῦτο δὲ παρασημήνασθαι χρή, ὅτι τοῖς τῶν πραγμάτων ὅροις οἱ χρόνοι οὐ 
συμπαραλαμβάνονται, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ οἱ τόποι. Τῶν γὰρ ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ καὶ μόνον λόγον 
ἐπέχουσιν.57 
 
This, too, must be remarked as an aside that the times are not included in the 
definitions of things, just as also the places. For they have merely the status of (sc. 
factors) without which (sc. things) do not (sc. exist). 
 
This very technical statement must be understood against the backdrop of the 
Aristotelian Categories where specific differences, which constitute first substances 
or ‘things’, are juxtaposed with the other categories. In  the sixth century this 
distinction had entered the theological discourse: Patriarch Anastasius of Antioch, 
for example, explains in his treatise against Philoponus’ Arbiter that ‘it is not 
possible to conceive of a body without also imagining together with it a suitable 
place and the other things without which it does not subsist, even if the body does 
not have its substantial constitution in the place itself’ (σῶμα μὴ ἐπινοῆσαι δυνατὸν 
ἄνευ τοῦ καὶ τόπον αὐτῷ συνεπινοῆσαι κατάλληλον καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὧν ἐκτὸς οὐχ 
ὑφέστηκε καίτοιγε οὐκ ἐν αὐτῷ ἔχει τῷ τόπῳ τὴν οὐσιώδη σύστασιν τὸ σῶμα).58 
Leontius appeals to this conceptual framework in order to justify his decision not 
to consider the temporal aspect. However, the list of categories that are non-
substantial but are nevertheless indispensible for concrete existence includes not 
only ‘time’ (χρόνος) and ‘place’ (τόπος) but also ‘relation’ (πρός τι). As we have 
seen this last category was the focus of the immediately preceding passage. There 
Leontius distinguishes between two types of completeness, ‘one that is spoken 
about in isolation and one that is seen in relation’ (τὸν μὲν ἁπλῶς λέγεσθαι, τὸν δὲ 
ἐν σχέσει θεωρεῖσθαι), and then states that the divine Word and the human soul 
need to be considered both on their own and in relation to the flesh and to the human 
body.59 In the case of relation, then, the lower ontological status was no obstacle to 
a consideration within the framework of the anthropological paradigm. This 
suggests that the different treatment of time and place is an arbitrary decision in 
order to conceal the author’s true beliefs about the coming-to-be of the soul.  
This interpretation can be confirmed through analysis of a passage in Leontius’ 
later treatise Solutiones, which addresses the Monophysite claim that acceptance of 
two natures in Christ leads necessarily to acceptance of two separate hypostases. 
There Leontius restates his earlier position that ‘all things, which while being 
complete are assumed in the constitution of a thing, become parts of the whole that 
is constituted from such parts while remaining complete’ (ὅσα τέλεια ὄντα εἴς τινος 
σύστασιν παρείληπται ταῦτα τέλεια μένοντα μέρη γίνεται τοῦ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων 
                                                 
57 CNE, PG 86, 1281D4-8, ed. Daley, p. 11, ll. 17-19. 
58 Anastasius of Antioch, Contra Arbitrum ed. S. N. Sakkos, Anastasii I Antiocheni opera omnia 
genuine quae supersunt (Salonica, 1976), p. 128, ll. 10-12. 
59 CNE, PG 86, 1281C10-12, ed. Daley, p. 11, ll. 10-12. 
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μερῶν ὅλου).60 However, the context is radically different. Leontius avers that it 
makes no sense to speak of two entities as divided if they have not yet been united. 
Instead one must distinguish between three stages, firstly things on their own, then 
their union, and finally their division.61 In this context he declares that ‘such (sc. 
things) are not spoken of in isolation but also in relation to something and when and 
where’ (οὐ γὰρ ἁπλῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρός τι, καί ποτε, καὶ ποῦ) and 
then adds the explanation that this is so ‘because (sc. the things are) not without 
which (sc. they are not)’ (οὐ γὰρ χωρὶς ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ).62 It is evident that here 
Leontius appeals to the same philosophical concept as in his earlier treatise but that 
he does so in order to support his claim that one must consider the temporal aspect, 
which is now treated in exactly the same fashion as the category of relation. This 
shows clearly the arbitrariness of the decision to exclude the temporal aspect in 
Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos. 
However, it would be wrong to conclude that in Contra Nestorians et 
Eutychianos Leontius simply dismisses the temporal aspect because he adds one 
further argument, which reads as follows: 
 
Ἔτι πᾶς ὅρος τοῦ νῦν πράγματός ἐστιν ὅρος, οὐ τοῦ ὕστερον ἐξ αὐτοῦ 
ἀποβησομένου· ἢ οὕτω γ’ ἂν οὐδὲν τῶν ἐν γενέσει δέξοιτ’ ἂν ὅρον τοῦ εἶναι ὅπερ 
ἐστὶν, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ μένει, ἀλλὰ μεταβάλλει πάντα εἰς πάντα τὰ ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ· 
ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ λογικαὶ πᾶσαι οὐσίαι, τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἐπιδεχόμεναι καὶ 
τὸ (an τῷ?) νῦν μὲν οὕτως, νῦν δὲ ἐκείνως, ἔχειν, ἐν κινήσει θεωροῦνται· τὸ γὰρ ἐπὶ 
τῶν αὐτῶν ἵστασθαι, οὐ τῆς κτιστῆς φύσεως ἴδιον, εἴπερ ἐπὶ θεοῦ καὶ μόνον τὸ <Σὺ 
δὲ ὁ αὐτὸς εἶ> κυριολεκτεῖται.63 
 
Furthermore, each definition is a definition of the present thing and not of the one 
that will later result from it for otherwise none of the things that come to be would 
admit a definition of being what it is, since the things that come to be and pass away 
do not remain but all things change into all things else. And all rational substances, 
too, which admit the more and less as regards virtue, are seen in motion insofar as 
they are at one time this way and at another time another way, for to remain static is 
not a property of created nature, since the verse ‘You are the same’ is properly said 
of God alone. 
 
In this paragraph Leontius gives another reason for his decision not to consider 
time and instead to limit the discussion to the definition of being. However, the 
argument he presents seems flatly to contradict his previous statement. Whereas 
before he had affirmed that time is merely a necessary corollary of the existence of 
creatures and does not affect their definitions of being he now seems to admit that 
these definitions are themselves subject to time and change. He argues that there 
                                                 
60 Solutiones, PG 86, 1937D2-4, ed. Daley, p. 91, ll. 26-28. 
61 Solutiones, PG 86, 1937B1-C1, ed. Daley, p. 91, ll. 16-26. 
62 Solutiones, PG 86, 1937B5-6, 14, ed. Daley, p. 91, ll. 8-9, l. 15. 
63 CNE, PG 86, 1281D8–1284A10, ed. Daley, p. 11, l. 19–p. 12, l. 6. 
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can be a change from one definition of being to another and then gives two 
examples to illustrate his point: firstly material beings, and secondly immaterial 
beings. In the former case one might first think that Leontius is referring to the fact 
that the matter of material beings changes continuously through ingestion of food 
and excretion of waste products. However, such a reading must be ruled out because 
a definition of being remains the same as long as a creature exists regardless of 
changes in the material substrate, in other words: a horse is always a horse and does 
not turn into a another species, not even in old age when its organs and faculties 
may no longer be complete. Indeed the statement ‘all into all else’ suggests that 
Leontius is rather considering matter as a constant, which can become the substrate 
for any number of different forms. Such an interpretation is confirmed through 
comparison with a treatise by the eleventh-century philosopher John Italos. Having 
stated that ageing is a change in matter because form is ‘unchangeable’ 
(ἀμετάβλητον) Italos concedes that in a certain sense one can also speak of ‘changes 
of form’ (εἴδους μεταβολαί) and then adds the clarification that such changes 
happen ‘not because we do not remain ourselves, since we are the form, but because 
everything changes and is submerged again in the limitless and indeterminate 
nature’ (οὐχ ἡμῶν μενόντων αὐτῶν, ἐπειδὴ τὸ εἶδός ἐσμεν, ἀλλὰ πάντα 
μεταβεβηκότων καὶ εἰς τὴν ἄπειρον καὶ ἀόριστον πάλιν βεβαπτισμένων φύσιν) 
from where then new forms arise.64 It is evident that this concept lends no support 
to Leontius’ contention that forms change because as Italos points out the 
definitions of being themselves remain constant.   
When we turn to the subsequent example of immaterial beings the argument 
becomes even more contrived. Here Leontius claims that immaterial beings are also 
subjected to change because they can become more or less virtuous. However, it 
was commonly accepted that such a change is merely accidental and does not affect 
the substances whose definitions of being remains stable and do in any case not 
admit of more or less.65 Indeed, Leontius himself makes this point in his Solutiones 
where he declares that in members of the same species a specific difference such as 
sensible or intelligible ‘is not more or less but alike and common and in general of 
a kind that amounts to a definition’ (οὐχ τοῦ μὲν μᾶλλον, τοῦ δὲ ἧττον, ἀλλ’ ὁμοίως 
καὶ κοινῶς καὶ τὸ ὁλον ὁριστικῶς).66 
There can be little doubt that contemporary readers would have been thoroughly 
bemused by this strangely incoherent argument. This raises the question: why 
would Leontius have struggled to force together such disparate concepts and treat 
them as if they were all examples of the same general rule? At this point we need 
                                                 
64 John Italos, Quaestiones quodlibetales, ed. P. Joannou (Studia Patristica et Byzantine, 4, Ettal, 
1956), p. 26, ll. 11-14. 
65 Cf. John of Damascus, Dialectica, 27, ed. B. Kotter, Die Schriften des Johannes von 
Damaskos, vol. 1-4 (Patristische Texte und Studien, 7, 12, 17, 22; Berlin, 1969-1981), vol. I, p. 92, 
ll. 12-14: ἡ μὲν διαφορὰ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον οὐκ ἐπιδέχεται, ἀλλὰ τὰ συμβεβηκότα. 
66 Solutiones, PG 86, 1921D4-5, ed. Daley, p. 81, ll. 10-12. 
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to remember that according to the Origenist myth rational creatures did indeed 
change as a consequence of their fall when they became subject to movement and 
received a body. Thus one could argue that Leontius attempted to indicate that the 
diminution of virtue in incorporeal beings should be understood not merely as an 
accidental change but as a change of substance, which took place when the minds 
became souls and entered the realm of time and space. In this case there would be 
two paradigms for the incarnation: the minds would constitute a strict parallel for 
the divine Word, whereas the fallen souls would differ in certain respects. Such an 
interpretation could be reconciled with Leontius argument in the next section 
because the statement that the soul has ‘received passible faculties that are 
combined with it for its benefit’ (παθητικὰς πρὸς τὸ αὐτῇ συμφέρον 
συναρμοσθείσας λαβοῦσα) leaves it open when this divine act took place.67 
In order to understand why Leontius made his case in such a roundabout way we 
need to consider that in the sixth century the Origenist myth had come under attack 
by mainstream Christians who regarded it as irreconcilable with the notion of a 
changeless creation of perfect substances. John Philoponus, for example, objected 
that ‘there … was no pre-existing soul, which then became something else at some 
other time and that no new species was therefore added to the universe’ (μηδεμιᾶς 
… προϋπαρχούσης ψυχῆς λογικῆς, ἄλλης δὲ ἐν ἄλλῳ γιγνομένης χρόνῳ, οὐδὲν τῷ 
παντὶ πρόσφατον εἶδος πεισῆλθεν) after God’s initial creative act.68 In support of 
their arguments anti-Origenists appealed to Aristotle because within Aristotelian 
philosophy the definitions of beings are indeed immutable. The authority of 
Aristotle was evidently so great that Leontius could not directly question it but had 
to content himself with combining various Aristotelian concepts in an attempt to 
subvert their traditional meanings. Significantly, the topic of change also surfaces 
in Leontius’ later treatise Solutiones. There he claims that the composition of the 
soul with the body is not a natural process but rather the result of a divine 
intervention.69 Although the temporal aspect is not considered there can be little 
doubt that here, too, Origenism is in the background. In his Ambigua Maximus 
declares against the Origenists that the soul cannot pre-exist the body because ‘it is 
not possible for any species to change from species to species without corruption’ 
(οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν δυνατὸν ἄνευ φθορᾶς ἐξ εἴδους εἰς εἶδος μεταβάλλειν τὸ οἱονοῦν 
εἶδος).70 By introducing change ‘above nature’ (ὑπὲρ φύσιν) as an alternative to 
change ‘against nature’ (παρὰ φύσιν) Leontius can rebut this argument effectively 
because God’s acts could not have resulted in corruption.71 This suggests that by 
the time he wrote the Solutiones Leontius had given up as fruitless his earlier 
                                                 
67 CNE, PG 86, 1284D11-13, ed. Daley, p. 13, l. 11-12.  
68 John Philoponus, De opificio mundi, VII.3, ed. G. Reichardt (Leipzig, 1897), p. 287, ll. 27-30. 
69 Solutiones, PG 86, 1940B3-12, ed. Daley, p. 92, ll. 8-20. 
70 Maximus, Ambigua, PG 91, 1101A4-6. 
71 For this juxtaposition, cf. Leontius of Jerusalem, Contra Nestorianos, I.23, PG 86, 1489B7-
C9, and discussion in Krausmüller, ‘Origenism’. 
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attempts at reconstructing Aristotle and had decided to rely on traditional Christian 
notions of divine omnipotence instead. 
From the discussion so far it appears that Leontius was defending the notion of 
pre-existence in a milieu where such a position was regarded not only as heretical 
but also as absurd.72 However, it would be wrong merely to consider him as a 
champion of Origenism in a narrow sense. Here we need to remember that his 
Nestorian adversaries not only rejected pre-existence but also an active afterlife and 
in fact the very notion of a self-sufficient soul. Eutherius, for example, insists in his 
Confutationes that the soul is not complete ‘as regards operation’ (εἰς ἐνέργειαν).73 
At first one might think that he is only referring to activities such as speaking or 
walking for which the soul ostensibly needs the body. However, when he claims 
that both body and soul are incomplete parts ‘for if one of them were a complete 
nature as regards operation, it would do something even without the other’ (εἰ … τι 
τούτων τελεία φύσις εἰς ἐνέργειαν, ἔπραξεν ἄν τι καὶ δίχα τοῦ ἄλλου) he seems to 
deny the soul any independent activity.74 Even more explicit is the author of the 
Nestorian treatise preserved in Leontius of Jerusalem’s Contra Nestorianos. He 
claims that after death ‘the rational (sc. faculty) is completely inactive’ (πάντῃ 
ἡσυχάζειν τὸ λογικόν) and then explains that this is so ‘because there exists nothing 
that is moved through self-willed counsel, which has no sensation of anything at 
all’ (ἐπεὶ μηδὲν αὐτοπροαιρέτῳ βουλῇ κινούμενον μηδενὸς ἔχον ὅλως αἴσθησιν 
ἔστιν).75 Here even the exercise of the properly mental functions is made dependent 
on the access of the soul to the organs of sense perception, and the subject of all 
activity is no longer the soul but rather the human compound as ‘one living being’ 
(ἓν ζῷον).76 It is evident that here we are in the presence of a model, which is 
diametrically opposite to that set out by Leontius. Whereas Leontius claims that the 
soul is autonomous within the body and therefore also self-sufficient outside it the 
Nestorians aver that it is entirely dependent on the body and therefore comatose 
after death.  
From the discussion so far it seems that Leontius does not engage with the 
conceptual framework of his adversaries. However, one last passage in Contra 
Nestorianos et Eutychianos that has not yet been analysed may help us to correct 
this picture. As we have seen before Leontius defines the soul as a self-moved 
incorporeal substance, which has ‘a life that is separable … and intrinsic’ (χωριστήν 
… καὶ ἰδίαν ζωήν). However, this definition does not stand on its own but is 
complemented with two definitions of the body:  
                                                 
72 Cf. Krausmüller, ‘Conflicting Anthropologies’,pp. 413-447. 
73 Eutherius, Confutationes, ed. Treu, p. 44, l. 17. 
74 Eutherius, Confutationes, ed. Treu, p. 44, ll. 15-16. 
75 Leontius of Jerusalem, Contra Nestorianos, I.51, PG 86, 1513D1-12. 
76 Leontius of Jerusalem, Contra Nestorianos, I.51, PG 86, 1513C8-9; cf. Eutherius, 
Confutationes, ed. Treu, p. 44, l. 6. 
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Τί δὲ (sc. λείποι) τῷ σώματι πρὸς τὸ εἶναι σῶμα; οὗ δὴ καὶ ἀποδιδόντες τὸν ὅρον 
φασί, σῶμα εἶναι τὸ τριχῇ διαστατόν, ἢ σῶμα φυσικὸν ὀργανικὸν δυνάμει ζωὴν 
ἔχον.77 
 
And what (sc. would be lacking) in the body for it to be a body? For those who 
provide its definition say that a body is that which is three-dimensional, or that it is a 
natural instrumental body, which potentially has life. 
 
The first definition, evidently intended as a counterpart to ‘incorporeal 
substance’ (οὐσία ἀσώματος), applies to all bodies, whether animate or inanimate. 
By contrast, the second definition focuses more specifically on living beings. At 
first sight Leontius’ argument appears to be entirely straightforward: the soul is not 
only itself alive but also confers life on the body. However, a hidden dimension is 
revealed when we realise that what Leontius offers us is not a definition of the body 
at all but rather part of an alternative definition of the soul as ‘first entelechy of a 
natural organic body that has life in potentiality’ (ἐντελέχεια πρώτη σώματος 
φυσικοῦ, ὀργανικοῦ, δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος).78 This definition is found in Aristotle’s 
treatise De anima where the relationship between body and soul is conceptualised 
as a special case of the general conceptual framework of form and matter. A body 
has the ‘potential’ (δύναμις) to come alive when it is organised in such a way that 
the soul can act through it. However, this does not mean that the soul is always 
active. While form implies ‘actuality’ (ἐνέργεια) it does so only in the sense of a 
‘disposition’ (ἕξις): a human being has the ability to see things, to make things, and 
to think about things but it realises these abilities only when it is awake and not 
when it is asleep.79 Moreover, according to Aristotle the soul as ‘entelechy’ is 
inseparable from the body and thus perishes with it.80 This interpretation, which 
became a cornerstone of Peripatetic philosophy, met with strong reactions from the 
Platonists who insisted on the self-movement and immortality of the soul. Some of 
them rejected Aristotle out of hand whereas others attempted to re-interpret the term 
‘entelechy’ in such a fashion that it could be identified with the Platonic soul.81 It 
is evident that Leontius follows the lead of this second group when he elides the 
term ‘entelechy’ because by doing so he gives the impression that the self-moved 
soul brings the body to life. However, this does not yet explain why he felt the need 
to introduce the Aristotelian concept at all.  
In the following I will make the case that Leontius was doing so because his 
Nestorian adversaries built their arguments on Aristotelian notions, just as he 
                                                 
77 CNE, PG 86, 1281B14-C3, ed. Daley, p. 10, l. 3 –p. 12, l. 2. 
78 Aristotle, De Anima II.1, 412a27–8 
79 Aristotle, De Anima II.1, 412a26. 
80 Aristotle, De Anima II.1, 413a4-6. 
81 A typical representative of the latter approach is John Philoponus, cf. W. Charlton, John 
Philoponus: On Aristotle On the Soul 2.1-6 (London and Ithaca, 2005) 
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himself had recourse to Plato. Traditionally, Antiochene authors had shown little 
interest in Greek philosophy. Accordingly, philosophical arguments are almost 
entirely absent from Eutherius of Tyana’ Confutationes. However, this situation 
changed radically in the sixth and seventh centuries. The Nestorian author whose 
treatise is preserved in Leontius of Jerusalem’s Contra Nestorianos, for example, 
is well versed in philosophy. This knowledge permits him to subvert the Platonic 
notion of a self-moved soul by distinguishing between potential and actual self-
movement and attributing the latter to the human compound.82 Significantly, this is 
an argumentative strategy that had already been used by Peripatetic philosophers 
several centuries earlier.83 Aristotelian influence is also evident in another passage 
in Leontius of Jerusalem’s Contra Nestorianos. There the Nestorian author claims 
that ‘the soul stops functioning by necessity when the body turns to sleep’ (ἡ ψυχὴ 
παύεται τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοῦ σώματος εἰς ὕπνον τρεπομένου) and thus 
reverts to a state where it has its operations only ‘in potentiality’ (δυνάμει), whereas 
Leontius insists that ‘great activity of the intellectual potential of the soul is 
produced during sleep’ (τῆς νοερᾶς τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεως πολλὴ ἐνέργεια κατὰ τοὺς 
ὕπνους προάγεται) and mentions as examples dreams, theophanies and revelations 
of future events.84 This exchange, too, has a counterpart in earlier controversies 
between representatives of different philosophical schools. The Peripatetics 
followed Aristotle’s view that during sleep the soul is inactive. By contrast, 
Platonists such as Jamblichus turned Aristotle’s argument on its head, claiming that 
the soul may mostly act through the body while we are awake ‘but during sleep we 
are completely released as if from some fetters that shackle us, and experience the 
separated life of knowledge’ (ἐν δὲ δὴ τῷ καθεύδειν ἀπολυόμεθα παντελῶς ὥσπερ 
ἀπό τινων παρακειμένων ἡμῖν δεσμῶν, καὶ τῇ κεχωρισμένῃ τῆς γνώσεως ζωῇ 
χρώμεθα).85 
Of course, this does not mean that sixth- and seventh-century Nestorians were 
slavishly dependent on Aristotle. As we have seen they rejected Aristotle’s view 
that the soul perishes with the body and insisted on its immortality.86 However, even 
here their concept of a sleep of the soul could well have been influenced by 
Aristotle’s understanding of sleep as a state of potentiality. If this interpretation is 
correct Leontius would have reacted against Nestorian adversaries who based their 
arguments on Aristotle’s De anima. By leaving out the crucial term ‘entelechy’ he 
gave the impression that he was merely offering a definition of the body. As a 
                                                 
82 Leontius of Jerusalem, Contra Nestorianos, I.51, PG 89, 1513C10-12. 
83 Pseudo-Alexander of Aphrodisias, Dubitationes et Solutiones, 55, ed. I. Bruns, Alexandri 
Aphrodisiensis praeter commentaria scripta minora (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca Suppl. 
2.1; Berlin, 1887), pp. 101-86: Ὅτι μὴ αὐτοκίνητος ἡ ψυχή.  
84 Leontius of Jerusalem, Contra Nestorianos Ι.14, PG 86, 1453Α2-3. 
85 Jamblichus, De mysteriis, III.3, ed. É. des Places, Jamblique. Les Mystères d'Égypte (Paris, 
1966), pp. 38-215. 
86 Leontius of Jerusalem, Contra Nestorianos, I.51, PG 86, 1513C13-14. 
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consequence the entity, which confers actual life on the body, is not the dependent 
form but rather self-sufficient Platonic soul, which is mentioned immediately 
before. By ‘Platonising’ Aristotle in this manner Leontius would have subverted 
the philosophical basis of his adversaries’ argument. 
This article has focused on one passage in Leontius of Byzantium’s treatise 
Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos in which the author defends his use of the 
anthropological paradigm against Nestorian criticism. Besides offering an analysis 
of Leontius’ arguments it has sought to reconstruct the position of his adversaries 
and to identify the philosophical concepts on which he relied. Such in-depth study 
of the text has permitted the conclusion that while Leontius never explicitly states 
his belief in the pre-existence of the soul he has constructed an argument in with 
such a belief is implied. The clues that he gives can easily escape the attention of 
modern scholars but it is likely that they were picked up by contemporary readers, 
not only those who shared his views but also anti-Origenists. Cyril of Scythopolis’ 
comment that Leontius ‘while pretending to defend the synod of Chalcedon was 
recognised an Origenist’ (τῆς γὰρ ἐν Χαλκηδόνι συνόδου προίστασθαι προσ-
ποιούμενος ἐγνώσθη τὰ Ὠριγένους φρονῶν) may refer to such unsympathetic 
readers of Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos.87 
As we have seen, Leontius was confronted with a twofold argument against the 
anthropological paradigm. His Nestorian adversary claimed that the Word cannot 
be compared with the soul because it pre-exists the human nature and is a complete 
and self-sufficient being whereas the soul comes into existence at the same time as 
the body and is an incomplete part of the whole human being. At first sight Leontius 
seems to accept his adversaries’ point that in these respects the Word and the soul 
do indeed differ from one another. However, a closer look reveals that this is not 
his last word on the matter. In his response Leontius mentions the pre-existence of 
the soul despite the fact that it does not constitute a divergent feature, and he 
demonstrates that both Word and soul are both complete beings and incomplete 
parts, thus creating a strict parallel between the incarnation and the coming-to-be 
of human beings. When setting out his own approach Leontius then only speaks 
about the composition of the Word with a body and not as one would expect about 
the composition of the Word with a human being. Such a statement is possible 
because Leontius focuses exclusively on qualities that the Word shares with the 
soul and makes no mention of the fact that for mainstream Christians the Word and 
the soul differ insofar as the former is ingenerate and the latter has been created by 
God. The impression that Leontius considers the soul as an ingenerate being is 
further strengthened by analysis of the following passage. This passage ostensibly 
deals with the parallel theme of completeness. However, when Leontius’ defines 
the soul as a complete being he does not follow the lead of his Nestorian adversary 
                                                 
87 Cyil of Scythopolis, Life of Sabas, 72, ed. Schwartz, p. 176, ll. 10-16; cf. also Life of Sabas, 
83, p. 188, l. 28 - p. 189, l. 1. 
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who had based his arguments on Aristotelian concepts. Instead, he switches to a 
Platonic framework, which permits him to present the soul as a self-moved being 
that continues to exist after the dissolution of the compound. Thus Leontius 
introduces the temporal aspect into a context where at first glance it seems to be 
absent. Moreover, the manner in which he speaks about the soul implies that it 
existed not only after but also before the body. By comparison, Leontius is more 
circumspect in the second part of the section, which deals directly with the temporal 
aspect. Here he supports his refusal to consider this aspect through recourse to 
philosophical concepts. At first his argument seems persuasive but comparison with 
the Solutiones shows that Leontius has made an arbitrary distinction, excluding the 
non-substantial qualities of time and place but including the equally non-substantial 
quality of relation. The last part of the section is taken up by a curiously convoluted 
argument about the changeability of material and immaterial beings. Close analysis 
suggests that Leontius was obliquely alluding to the Origenist notion of a substantial 
change that turned pre-existing minds into embodied souls. Taken together, these 
observations leave little doubt that was indeed an Origenist. However, his quotation 
and subsequent manipulation of the Aristotelian definition of the soul raises the 
possibility that Leontius was engaging in a wider debate about the nature of the soul 
and its relation to the body. The fact that at his time the self-sufficiency of the soul 
was no longer universally accepted reminds us that the terms of the debate had 
changed radically since the first Origenist controversy in the early fifth century when 
only the specific notion of pre-existence had been an issue.  
 
